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We study the effect of releasing public information about productivity or monetary shocks when agents
learn from nominal prices. While public releases have the benefit of providing new information, they
can have the cost of reducing the informational efficiency of the price system. We show that, when
agents have private information about monetary shocks, the cost can dominate, in that public releases
increase uncertainty about fundamentals. In some cases, public releases can create or eliminate multiple
equilibria. Our results are robust to adding velocity shocks, imperfectly observable prices, large idiosyncratic
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Economic statistics are noisy. For example, the rst estimates of GDP in the U.S., published
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, are very imprecise. Only half of the data required to
compute it, is known completely at the time of the rst release; and the original numbers are
subsequently subject to signicant revisions.1 Some economic statistics are even considered
too noisy to be published: a recent example is the monetary aggregate M3 that the Federal
Reserve Board stopped reporting in March 2006.
Should one be concerned that releasing noisy statistics may create confusion and lead
the private sector to act on incorrect information? At rst pass, the notion that more public
information leads to more uncertainty and therefore worse decisions is unwarranted. Indeed,
if we treat other sources of information as exogenous, a rational Bayesian decision maker
will always be better informed after having observed a public signal, however noisy. But,
in reality, not all sources of information are exogenous: households and rms learn through
their interactions in markets and from observing variables such as prices. Our contribution in
this paper is to show that when the information structure of an economy is endogenous, the
release of public signals about aggregate fundamentals can actually lead to more confusion
and greater uncertainty than no release at all. Moreover, public releases can create multiple
Pareto-ranked equilibria, and consequently even modest announcements can result in large
changes in equilibrium outcomes and uncertainty.
We provide a full characterization of the eects of public information releases in a mon-
etary model inspired by that of Lucas (1972). In our cash-in-advance economy, households
are uncertain about two aggregate disturbances, a monetary shock and a productivity shock.
Households inhabit dierent locations and are asymmetrically informed regarding the two
aggregate shocks. This dispersed private information about shocks is aggregated through
the publicly observable equilibrium nominal prices prevailing every location. The nominal
prices are aected not only by the underlying productivity shock but also by the unknown
monetary shock, and, for that reason, households care indirectly about the monetary shock:
knowledge about it helps them extract productivity information from nominal prices.
Our results are based on the following two observations. The rst is that publicly observ-
able prices not only generate new public information about productivity, they also generate
1See, for instance, the article \Why America's advance GDP gures do not paint the whole picture"
published by The Economist on January 31st, 2008.
2new private information. This is because households extract productivity information from
nominal prices by ltering out the monetary shock in two ways. On the one hand, they use
their public knowledge about the monetary shock, which eectively generates an endogenous
public signal about productivity. On the other hand, they use their private knowledge about
the monetary shock, which generates an endogenous private signal about productivity.
The crucial decision for a household is choosing how much weight to give to its private
versus its public information. Our second observation concerns the relationship between this
optimal weighting decision and the two endogenous signals: the endogenous private signal
tends to make households' weighting decisions strategic complements, while the endogenous
public signal tends to make their weighting decisions strategic substitutes. The intuition
for this second observation is the following. When other households put more weight on
their private information, the two endogenous signals generated by prices become more
informative about productivity, as more private information gets fed into the prices. Since
the endogenous private signal is now more informative, an individual household will nd
it optimal to put more weight on it, a force for complementarity. At the same time, the
endogenous public signal has become also more informative, and a household will then put
more weight on it, and less weight on the private ones, a force for substitutability.
What is, then, the eect of releasing partial information about the monetary shock, the
productivity shock, or both at the same time? As stated at the beginning, everything else
equal, such releases have a direct benecial eect of providing new information. There is,
however, a countervailing equilibrium eect: households put more weight on the newly re-
leased public information and less on their private information. This change in behavior tends
to reduce the endogenous informational content of prices. The strategic complementarities
play the crucial role of amplifying this initial negative eect: households put less weight on
the endogenous private signal, making prices less informative, prompting households to put
even less weight on the endogenous private signal, making prices even less informative, and
so on. In fact, due to this amplication mechanism, in equilibrium the negative eect can
dominate the positive eect, increasing households' uncertainty and reducing welfare. Such
amplication is necessary for the result: in its absence we show that public information is
always benecial.
Because of the strategic complementarities created by the endogenous private signal, our
model can feature multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria diering in the degree of informativeness
3of nominal prices. For instance, in the high-informativeness, high-welfare equilibrium, other
households put a large weight on their private information. The endogenous private signal
generated by prices is thus more informative, making it optimal for an individual household
to put a large weight on its private information. We also uncover another eect of public
announcements: a release of suciently precise information about either the productivity
or the monetary shock can guarantee a unique equilibrium. However, a mild release can,
instead, generate multiplicity.
In our basic model we do not take a stand on the sources of the monetary shock and the
reasons why the policy maker does not posses complete information about it. Subsection 5.1
addresses this question explicitly in an extension of the model with two dierent monetary
shocks. The rst shock is a change in a narrow monetary aggregate, which is assumed to
perfectly observed by a Central Bank. The second shock is an aggregate velocity shock,
representing changes in general credit conditions in the economy that are assumed to be
imperfectly observed by a Central Bank and not known to the households. We also allow
for a public noise component in the observation of nominal prices. We then proceed to show
that the results from the basic model generalize to this multidimensional case, and obtain a
general characterization of whether public releases are welfare reducing or not.
One may argue that the introduction of a nancial market that could aggregate informa-
tion might eliminate the non-fully revealing equilibrium that we obtain, which is necessary
for the negative welfare results. In the subsection 5.2, we show that the basic model is robust
to the introduction of a nancial market where a nominal bond is traded.
There is a recent and inuential literature documenting that, at the rm-level, prices and
quantities are an order of magnitude more volatile than their corresponding aggregate (see,
among others, Bils and Klenow, 2004). As such, a possible criticism of our analysis is that the
economic agents are not too concerned about forecasting underlying macroeconomic shocks,
but instead they are mainly responding to idiosyncratic shocks. We discuss in Subsection 5.3
that those criticisms are unwarranted. We present a simple modication of our baseline model
with idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Although agents face arbitrarily volatile idiosyncratic
shocks, social welfare is still driven by their uncertainty about the macroeconomic shocks:
that is, the component that is aected by public announcements and the publication of
economic statistics.
4Literature Review
Relative to the vast existing literature on public communication in macroeconomics, our main
contribution is to show formally that more public information can lead to an overall increase
of uncertainty about fundamentals. Although this eect has been conjectured before, it is
not present in previous models of welfare reducing public information.
The basis of our analysis is a learning externality: agents respond to new public infor-
mation by relying less on their own private information, which can reduce the informational
content of prices. This externality has been noted and studied before, and our paper builds
on the work of Vives (1993), Morris and Shin (2005), and Amato and Shin (2006). In these
papers, however, the net eect of public information remains positive: it reduces agents
uncertainty about fundamentals. Relative to this literature, our contribution is threefold.
First, we uncover an amplication mechanism for the learning externality to generate, on its
own, an increase in uncertainty about fundamentals: we show that some of the endogenous
information gathered by agents has to be private. Second, we formalize the argument in a fa-
miliar macroeconomic model which allows for a micro-founded welfare analysis. And nally,
we show that this private information gathering arises naturally from the public observation
of prices. This last step is important since prices arguably constitute the most important
channel of information aggregation and are publicly observed.
A variant of the basic result also appears in our contemporaneous paper, Amador and
Weill (2006). However, the focus of Amador and Weill (2006) is on transitional and long-run
information dynamics in an abstract learning model; which lacking micro-foundations, is not
well suited for welfare analysis.
We have chosen to develop our theoretical argument with a model in the spirit of Lucas
(1972). This framework is familiar to most macro-economists and is a canonical example of
imperfect information. However, most of our results are easily generalizable to other settings,
as long as agents are learning from an endogenous source of information, such as in the noisy
rational expectations models of Grossman (1975) and Hellwig (1980). One advantage of
our exible price setup is to clearly separate our mechanism from the ones based on pricing
complementarities, which have been the center of the macroeconomic literature building on
Morris and Shin (2002) (as described in the next paragraph). That said, one could make the
model more realistic by adding real rigidities or other sources of complementarities, but at
the cost of making the results less transparent.
5In a recent inuential work, Morris and Shin (2002) have proposed a dierent, coordination-
based mechanism of the welfare cost of public information releases. Agents desire to achieve
coordination in their actions, but such behavior is socially undesirable. For that reason a
public signal, by allowing agents to coordinate their actions, can be socially harmful, even
though it reduces agents' uncertainty about fundamentals. Whether such a trade-o is rel-
evant or not for policy (and in particular monetary policy) has been the subject of much
discussion. It is now known that in the coordination-based neo-keynesian models of Hellwig
(2005), Roca (2006), and Lorenzoni (2007), there is no trade-o: releases of public infor-
mation are socially benecial. More generally, Angeletos and Pavan (2007) have found the
conditions on linear-quadratic preferences under which public information releases are so-
cially harmful, and have shown that the negative welfare results are very sensitive to the
preference structure. Similarly to Morris and Shin (2002), our results are driven by the im-
pact of public information on agents' relative weighting of private versus public information.
Dierently, in our model, agents do not suer from a socially harmful desire to coordinate:
public information releases are welfare reducing because they increase agents' uncertainty
about fundamentals. Our model also has the positive implication that the publication of
economic statistics can result in less accurate forecasts, a prediction which is amenable to
empirical work. The virtue of this prediction is its simplicity: testing it does not require the
econometrician to make additional assumptions on preferences parameters, or on the social
value of coordination.
Lastly, several authors have studied the interactions of public communication with public
policy (see Moscarini, 2007; Atkeson et al., 2007; Eusepi and Preston, 2007; Taub, 1997).
Our approach here applies to the publication of economic statistics as well as communication
of economic outlook, taking all other aspects of public policy as given.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts by presenting the basic
model set up, and proceeds by dening and characterizing its linear equilibria. The second
main result on welfare eects is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 studies three extensions.
Subsection 5.1 introduces velocity shocks and imperfect observability of the price level, and
studies optimal announcements of narrow versus broad monetary aggregates. We obtain
a simple characterization of whether a release of marginal public information about any
shock is welfare reducing: it occurs if the ratio of public to private knowledge about that
particular shock is suciently small. Subsection 5.2 shows that the opening of a bond market
6that could aggregate more information does not change the results. Subsection 5.3 shows
that our results are robust to the introduction of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Section
6 concludes. All omitted proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a standard cash-in-advance model modied to allow for three features of interest.
First, we introduce a real shock that aects the cost of producing that, initially, is imperfectly
and dierentially known by households. Second, we allow for dierential information among
households regarding the monetary shock (such heterogeneity is naturally generated by id-
iosyncratic initial money holdings). Finally, as in Townsend (1983), even though there is no
trade across locations, every household observes the economy-wide distribution of nominal
prices and learns from them.
Preferences and Technology
Time is discrete. Although the model is essentially static, we let time be innite so that
money is valued. The economy is composed of a [0;1]-continuum of locations. In each
location there are competitive rms operating a linear technology, transforming one unit of
labor into one unit of the consumption good. Firms hire labor in a competitive local labor
market and sell their output in a competitive local goods market. Because labor and goods
are immobile, the relative wage in terms of the consumption good is unity in all locations.
At each time t 2 f1;2;:::g in location i 2 [0;1] a representative household chooses its
eort supply, Lit, consumption, Cit, and money balance, Md



























7where Pit denotes the nominal price level in location i at time t. The initial money balance
of the representative household of location i is Md
i0 = Mi.
Exogenous Information about Money
At time t = 1, an aggregate monetary shock causes households to be uncertain about the
aggregate money supply: they share the common prior that the logarithm of the aggregate
money supply is m+  m, where m is a normally distributed monetary shock with mean zero,
precision 	m, and  m is some constant known to everyone.
In practice, how could households be uncertain about the money supply? First, although
the Federal Reserve Board publishes weekly data on money aggregates M1 and M2, the
estimates are subsequently revised as depository institutions either report new data or revise
the data they previously reported.2 In addition, one may argue that even error-free measures
of M1 and M2 remain noisy estimates of the \true" measure of aggregate liquidity that enters
the quantity equation and directly inuences the price level. This measure of aggregate
liquidity may include some less liquid assets omitted in M1 and M2 and could be inuenced
by unobserved velocity shocks. We formalize this argument in Section 5.1 by adding velocity
shocks to the model.
The initial money endowment of the representative household of location i 2 [0;1] is
logMi  ^ mi = m + "mi; (4)
where "mi is normally distributed across locations with mean zero and precision  m. Thus,
the logarithm of the aggregate money supply is logM  m + (2 m) 1.3
Note that the initial money endowment constitutes private information about the aggre-
gate money supply. This initial private information will be the key driver of our result.4
2See the December 2006 \Performance Evaluation of the Statistical Release about Money Stock Measures"
on the Federal Reserve Board website:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/perfeval2006.htm
3Hence,  m = (2 m) 1. We could shift the mean of ^ mi up and down by any constant to obtain a dierent
 m, without changing any of our results.
4In all what follows, \private information" refers to a piece of information that is known solely by house-
holds in a given location.
8Exogenous Information about Productivity
A key timing assumption of our model is that the cost of eort, , is unknown as of time
t = 1 but is revealed to everyone at t = 2. The objective of this timing assumption is to
introduce a risky investment in the model. Indeed, in the rst period of our equilibrium,
households will choose the amount of eort, Li1, to put in their work, but the return on their
investment will have a random component,  Li1. While there are, of course, other and
perhaps more standard models of risky investment, our timing assumption has the advantage
of keeping the analysis tractable and transparent. We assume that all households share the
common prior that log()   is normally distributed with a mean of zero and precision 	,
and is independent of the aggregate money supply. Households also observe a private signal
about the eort cost:
^ i =  + "i; (5)
where "i is normally distributed with mean of zero and precision  .
We assume that the random variables , m, "i and "mi, are all pairwise independent.5
In what follows, we will use uppercase 	 (lowercase  ) to denote the precisions of public
(private) information about aggregate variables. As is standard in the literature, we measure
the amount of information in precision units. For instance, the amount of public information
about money is measured by 	m. The overall precision structure is summarized in Table 1.
Importantly, public releases of exogenous information about m and  translate into increases
in 	m and 	.6 Hence, in order to study the eect of public information releases, it suces
to conduct comparative static exercises with respect to the exogenous parameters 	m and
	.
5Sun (2006) provides the precise construction of a probability space where the exact law of large numbers
holds for a continuum of pairwise independent random variables.
6For example, suppose households start with a common prior has precision 	 and receive a public
signal  + u, where u is normally distributed and independent from everything else, with a mean of zero
and a precision of . Then, the households' posterior precision is equal to 	 + , and releasing public
information amounts to increasing 	. Importantly, in this comparative static exercise, one should keep
constant the precision 	 of the common prior: indeed, increasing 	 at the same time would reduce
fundamental volatility, which may have a confounding impact on ex ante welfare. The proof of Proposition 5
shows that we do not need, however, to be explicit about holding 	 constant: welfare turns out to depend
only on the posterior precision 	 = 	 +  and on the prior mean of log, which is equal to zero.
9Table 1: Precision structure.
Money supply: m Eort shock: 
Public Information 	m 	
Private Information  m  
Endogenous Information from Nominal Prices
The only way the locations are connected is informationally: households observe the distribu-
tion of nominal prices of the entire economy when making their labor supply and consumption




As we will show later on, the average price level will become a sucient statistic of the entire
price distribution in equilibrium.
Market Clearing Conditions
We assume that goods and labor cannot ow across locations, so that the goods market must
clear locally:
Cit = Lit (7)
for all i 2 [0;1] and t 2 f1;2;:::g. Also the money markets are in equilibrium:7
M
d
it = Mi: (8)
2.1 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is made up of a sequence of distributions of consumption, labor and money
holdings across locations, together with a distribution of prices in the economy such that, at
each time,
(i) given the information conveyed by the distribution of prices in the economy and given
the local price, households choose consumption, labor and money holdings to maximize
7We could instead impose an aggregate money market clearing condition:
R
Md
itdi = M. Indeed, the fact
that goods and factors are immobile will, by applying Walras' Law in each location, imply condition (8).
10their expected utility;
(ii) every local goods market clears.
Before characterizing an equilibrium formally, it is convenient to rst analyze the house-
hold's problem.
Solving the Household's Problem
Consider the representative household of location i 2 [0;1] and let t 1it and t 1it be
the non-negative Lagrange multipliers of its budget constraint (2) and CIA constraint (3).
Then, the rst-order conditions for consumption, labor and money balances are
1
Cit
= it + it (9)









where the expectation operator, Eit [], is conditional on all the information available to
household i as of time t.
Anticipating that the CIA constraint binds at all times, that is Cit = Md
it 1=Pit, it follows
that it + it = Pit=Md
it 1. In addition, plugging the goods market clearing condition (7)






implying that a household's money holdings must stay equal to its initial money endowment
at each time, i.e. Md
it = Mi (the money market is clearing). Now, together with equations
(10) and (11), these manipulations show that8
Pit = 
 1MiEit []: (12)
Plugging this back into the binding CIA constraint, we obtain an inverse relationship between
8 The price level in each location is uniquely determined by the expectations of  and the money holdings:
there are not multiple monetary equilibria (a common occurrence in monetary models). This determinacy
is due to our log preference specication.
11consumption and the expected eort cost,
Cit = Eit []
 1 : (13)
Plugging this into equation (9), we obtain that Ei[]= = it +it. Together with (10), this
implies that it = (1   )Eit []= is strictly positive, conrming our guess that the CIA
constraint is binding at all times.
Note that the households are concerned only with the cost parameter . Because the
goods markets clear locally and the local money supply is constant and known, uncertainty
about the aggregate money supply does not directly aect the households' problem. However,
as seen in equation (12), nominal prices in the economy combine local expectations about
the cost parameter and local money supplies. Thus, information about money will aect
households' ability to extract information about  from observing the economy-wide prices.
Equilibrium After the Second Period
From period t = 2 onwards, households know the exact realization of . Hence, we have
from equation (12) that, in equilibrium
Pit = 
 1Mi
Cit = Lit = 
 1
for all t  2. So quantities and prices are determined from t = 2 onwards.
Linear Equilibrium in the First Period
As we proceed to study the competitive equilibrium in the rst period, and given that the
economy is stationary from t = 2 onwards, we simplify notations by removing the time
subscript from all rst-period variables.
Borrowing from the literature on noisy rational expectations in nancial markets (see,
among many others, Grossman, 1975; Hellwig, 1980), we restrict ourselves to linear equilibria:
Denition 1 (Linear Equilibrium). A linear equilibrium is a cross-sectional distribution of
nominal prices, Pi, consumption, Ci, eort supplies, Li, and expectations about , Ei [],
such that
12i) conditional on the realization of (m;), the distribution of prices is log-normal with
constant dispersion and a mean parameter
p = 0 + 1 + 2m (14)
for some constants 0, 1 and 2;
ii) households' expectations are rational; that is, after observing their private signals
(^ mi; ^ i) and the distribution of nominal prices in the economy,
Ei [] = E
h
j ^ i; ^ mi;p
i
; (15)
iii) households decisions are optimal and markets clear:




To understand our rational expectations condition (15), note the following: even though
households observe the entire cross-sectional distribution of nominal prices, it is sucient
for them to condition expectations with respect to only one moment of the distribution, the
average price level p. Indeed, in the equilibria we consider, the distribution of prices in the
economy is log-normal and, hence, is uniquely parameterized by its mean and its dispersion.
Given the additional requirement in part (i) that the dispersion does not depend on the
realization (m;), the mean parameter, p, conveys all the information embedded in the price
distribution.
3 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section we proceed to characterize the set of equilibria.
3.1 The Household's Information Updating Problem
The analysis of the household's updating problem is based on the following insight: although
prices are publicly observable, they also generate private information about productivity.
13A Transformation of the Household's Information Set
We start by noting that observing the average log-price, p, is informationally equivalent to
a signal ^ z, such that
^ z =  + m=A; (18)
where A = 1=2, given that 0, 1 and 2 are constant. A simple transformation of
households' information set implies:
Lemma 1. The joint observation of ^ i = +"i, ^ mi = m+"mi and ^ z = +m=A is equivalent
to the joint observation of
^ i =  + "i (19)
^ z =  + m=A (20)
^ zi  ^ z   ^ mi=A =    "mi=A: (21)
Proof. This follows immediately by replacing ^ mi by ^ zi  ^ z   ^ mi=A in a household's infor-
mation set, while keeping the two other observations, ^ i and ^ z, the same.
Observing the price level, p, generates two independent signals about . There is rst
a public signal of precision A2	m, given by (20), which intuitively follows from extracting
productivity information from the price level, based on the public information about the
money supply. Second, the price also generates a private signal about  of precision A2 m,
given by (21), which follows from extracting productivity information from the price level,
based on the private information, ^ mi, about the money supply. The nding that the publicly
observable price level also generates a private signal is the main insight of the lemma, and
will be a key driver of our results.
Information Updating
Given the three signals of Lemma 1, a household proceeds to calculate its posterior be-
liefs about . In order to build intuition, we decompose the household's posterior-belief
calculation in the following three steps.
First, conditional on its private information, ^ i and ^ zi, and given a fully diuse prior, a








  + A2 m
^ i +
A2 m




 =   + A
2 m: (23)
Equation (22) is the standard Bayesian updating formula for independent signals and normal
distribution: the private posterior belief about  is a convex sum of the two private signals,
with convex weights reecting the signals' relative precisions. The posterior private precision,
 0
, is obtained by adding up the precisions of the two private signals.
Secondly, conditional on the public signal, ^ z, and given the common prior that  is log-
normally distributed with mean zero and precision 	, a household forms the public posterior











 = 	 + A
2	m: (25)
Finally, a household combines the private and the public belief together to form their full-
information posterior belief. Namely, conditional on both the private and the public signals,
a household's posterior beliefs is that  is log-normally distributed, with a mean given by
Ei [] = aE

j ^ i; ^ zi






which is a convex combination of the private posterior belief and the public posterior belief.









  + A2 m
  + A2 m + 	 + A2	m
: (27)
The household's full-information posterior precision about  is equal to  0
 +	0
, the sum of
the private and public precision.
153.2 Information Aggregation
Having solved for the household's beliefs given the information structure, we proceed now to
characterize the equilibrium distribution of prices. We verify our guess that the average log
price is observationally equivalent to observing a signal ^ z =  +m=A. Importantly, we show
that, in an equilibrium, the A parameter must be equal to the weight a that an individual
household puts on its private information.
Equilibrium Prices
From the logarithms of (17) it follows that






where the last term appears because of Jensen's inequality. Taking the cross-sectional aver-
age, we obtain that the average log price is
p =
Z
pi di =  log +
Z
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The second line follows from substituting equation (26) into the rst line. The third line,
(29), follows because, by equation (22), the private beliefs E

j ^ i; ^ zi

are independent and




is known to everyone, the only
part of the average log price that is unknown to households is m + a. Hence, observing
the average log price is equivalent to observing m + a or, after dividing by a, observing
 + m=a. Comparing with our guess (18), we obtain the equilibrium condition
A = a: (30)
Taken together, the best reply (27) and the above equilibrium condition (30) imply that
A must solve the xed-point equation
A =
  + A2 m
  + A2 m + 	 + A2	m
: (31)
16The right hand side of this xed-point equation is a continuous mapping from the real line
into [0;1]. It follows, then:
Proposition 1. There exists at least one solution to the xed-point equation (31). And there
is a one-to-one correspondence between solutions of this equation and linear equilibria.
3.3 Complementarities and Substitutabilities in Actions
Before proceeding into the characterization of the equilibria, in this subsection we make
an observation that is important for understanding our results: the endogenous private
information generated by prices is shown to make households' actions strategic complements,
while the endogenous public information is shown to make them strategic substitutes.
Recall that a household's posterior belief about  can be written as the convex combina-
tion aE







of its private and public beliefs. The convex weight a thus
represents the weight a household puts on its private information. The individually optimal
weight is given by the best-reply function (27), which can be written






  + A






)   0
=( 0
 + 	0
). Furthermore, in (32), A can be interpreted as the weight
chosen by all other households: the \aggregate weight."
When the aggregate weight A increases, that is when other households rely more on their
private information, prices aggregate more new private information. This increases both the
precision A2 m of the private signal and the precision A2	m of the public signal generated
by prices. These increases have two opposite eects on the individually optimal weight, a.
The rst eect, which follows because @H=@ 0
 > 0, tends to increase a. Indeed, when A
goes up, the precision of the private signal generated by prices goes up, and an individual
household's total private information,  0
 =  +A2 m, increases. Holding public information
	0
 the same, an individual household will nd it optimal to rely more on this improved
private information, i.e., to increase a. Therefore, the endogenous private signal generated
by prices tends to make households' weighting decisions strategic complements.
Because @H=@	0
 < 0, there is also an opposite eect. When A increases, the precision
of the public signal generated by prices increases as well, and an individual household's total
public information, 	0
 = 	+A2	m, increases. Holding private information  0
 constant, an
17individual household will nd it optimal to rely more on this improved public information
and less on its private information, i.e., to decrease a. Therefore, the endogenous public
signal generated by price tends to make households' actions strategic substitutes.
Which of the two eect dominates depends on parameter values. To see this, note that
H( 0
;	0
) = H( 0
=	0
;1) is homogenous of degree zero in ( 0
;	0
). Since H increases in its
rst argument, it follows that the best reply (32) is increasing in A if and only if the ratio
 0
=	0
 is increasing in A, that is,





















That is, if and only if, when A increases, the total precision of private information grows
faster than the total precision of public information.
Proof. Follows directly from taking derivatives and rearranging.
The lemma provides an intuitive condition for households' actions to be strategic comple-
ments. When  m is large or when 	m is small, the private channel generates proportionally
more information than the public one. In this case, an increase in the aggregate weight, A,
increases the precision of the private signal proportionally more than the public one, a force
for complementarities. Also, when   is small or 	 is large the public prior information be-
fore observing prices is more precise than the private: this implies that the posterior private
precision,   + A2 m, is proportionally more aected by an increase in A than the public
posterior precision, 	 + A2	m. This is, again, a force for complementarities.
3.4 Public Information and Multiplicity
This subsection explains how the complementarities identied above may create multiple
equilibria. We also explain the impact on multiplicity of changing the public information as
given by (	m;	).
To that end, we start by xing the private information parameters ( m; ) and we let
M( m; ) be the set of (	m;	) such that there are multiple (more than one) equilibria.
We start by three elementary properties:
18Proposition 2. The set function M( m; ) has the following properties: (i) it is empty
if and only if  m=   27, (ii) it is homogeneous of degree one, i.e., for all  > 0,
M( m; ) = M( m; ), and (iii) it is bounded.
The rst point of the proposition simply says that, if  m=   27, then there exists
a unique equilibrium for any pair (	m;	), and otherwise, there exists multiple ones for
some (	m;	). The second point of the proposition follows directly from the fact that the
equilibrium equation (31) is homogenous of degree zero in the precision parameters: scaling
all precision parameters ( m; ;	m;	) up and down by the same constant won't change
the set of equilibrium weights, A. This means that multiplicity does not depend on the
absolute level of information, but on how the information is divided among the dierent
sources. What does matter for multiplicity is the relative amount of public information,
(	m;	), versus private information, ( m; ). Indeed, as shown in the third point of the
proposition, for each ( m; ), the set M( m; ) is bounded; that is, holding ( m; ) xed,






Figure 1: The set M and its boundaries.
To simplify notations, from now on we suppress the dependence of M on the private
information vector ( m; ).
19Proposition 3. For all ( m; ) such that  m=  > 27, the set M is delimitated by contin-
uous, strictly positive, strictly decreasing upper and lower boundaries
U(	m) = maxf	 : (	;	m) 2 Mg
L(	m) = minf	 : (	;	m) 2 Mg;
dened for 0  	m <  	m 
p
 m=(27 )   1, and satisfying L( 	m) = U( 	m)
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the set M in the (	m;	) plane.
Multiple equilibria arise when (	;	m) lies in between the two boundaries. The boundaries
are strictly positive. Thus, when (	m;	) is small enough, there is a unique equilibrium
and a mild increase in the public information vector may create multiplicity.
Figure 2 shows graphically how changing public information distorts the xed-point equa-
tion and can create multiple equilibria. For a low value of 	m, complementarities are strong
and the right-hand-side of the xed-point equation, (31), has a sharply increasing S-shape; it
has a unique intersection with the 45-degree line in the upper branch of the S. For a middle
value of 	m, the S-shape rises more slowly and three intersections arise. When 	m is large,
the S becomes decreasing and a unique intersection is obtained. A similar graphical analysis






Figure 2: The impact of changing 	m on the xed-point equilibrium equation.
20The following proposition accounts for all equilibria:
Proposition 4. Given ( m; ) such that  m=  > 27, then:
(i) for all (	m;	) in the interior of M, there are three equilibria, AL < AM < AH;
(ii) for all (	m;	) either on the upper or lower boundaries of M, there are two distinct
equilibria, AL < AH; for ( 	m;U( 	m)), there is only one;
(iii) as (	m;	) approaches the lower boundary from below, the unique equilibrium con-
verges to AH;
(iv) as (	m;	) approaches the upper boundary from above, the unique equilibrium con-
verges to AL.
Thus, in the interior of the multiple equilibrium region, M, there are three equilibria.
Note that there are two distinct equilibria on the boundaries of M but, just outside M,
there is a unique equilibrium. Hence, as one enters M, at least one \new" equilibrium must
appear. This is what is demonstrated by the third and fourth points of the proposition: a
strictly lower equilibrium, AL, appears as one enters M from below, and a strictly higher
equilibrium, AH, appears as one enters M from above.
4 Public Information and Welfare
This section analyzes the welfare impact of public information releases about m and .
Public information has a direct benecial eect: taking the aggregate weight, A, as given,
it increases the total knowledge of the households and allows for more informed decisions.
However, it also has the negative eect of reducing the weight that households put on their
private information, which reduces the endogenous informational content of nominal prices.
If  m > 0, so that prices generate private information, then the second eect can dominate.
4.1 Welfare Criterion and Equilibrium Selection
We take our criterion to be utilitarian welfare: the ex ante utility of a representative house-
hold. In our model, it turns out to be an increasing function of households' equilibrium
posterior precision about :
21Proposition 5. In a linear equilibrium, ex-ante utilitarian welfare is an increasing function
of the posterior precision,  0
 + 	0
 =   + A2 m + 	 + A2	m, about .
Households' ex-ante welfare goes up with the total precision of their rst-period beliefs,
 0
 + 	0
. This simply means that households are better o if they know more about 
when they make their labor supply decisions. Although intuitive, this result is not a forgone
conclusion: as it is well known, information does not necessarily have a positive social value.9
Multiple equilibria introduce a standard diculty for welfare analysis. Indeed, one has
to decide which equilibrium households coordinate on, and dierent equilibria often admit
opposite comparative statics. In this section we focus on the highest welfare equilibrium,
so that we abstract from the negative welfare impact of coordination failure. Also, as will
become clear later, our main welfare result does not depend on multiplicity: it also holds in
regions of the parameter space where the equilibrium is unique. Proposition 5 immediately
implies:
Lemma 3. The highest welfare equilibrium corresponds to the largest solution, A?, of the
equilibrium xed-point equation (31).
4.2 A U-Shaped Welfare Function





 =   + A
2
? m + 	 + A
2
?	m:
One sees that, holding A? constant, both 	 and 	m increase public knowledge. This is
the intuitive direct benecial eect of public information: it directly increases knowledge
about , or it increases knowledge about money, m, which allows households to extract more
information about  from nominal prices.
There is, however, a countervailing equilibrium eect: following an increase in public
information about either  or m, households put less weight on their private knowledge,
reducing the equilibrium weight A?. This indirect eect tends to decrease the informational
content of prices:
9Perhaps the best known example is from Hirshleifer (1971), who shows that information destroys insur-
ance opportunities. See, also, the rst chapter of Brunermeier (2001) and the references therein.
22Lemma 4. In the highest welfare equilibrium, the equilibrium weight, A?: (i) is strictly
decreasing in 	m and 	, and goes to zero as either 	m or 	 go to innity and (ii) is
continuous in (	m;	) everywhere except at the upper boundary of M, 	 = U(	m), where
it jumps downwards (when moving from the interior of the set M to a point outside).
Note that, as 	m and 	 increase smoothly, when the negative jump in A? occurs, society
incurs a discrete welfare loss. Now, from the xed-point equation, (31), one can write that,
  + A
2






where the left-hand side is the total posterior precision of households' beliefs. A change in
	m or 	 aects the right hand side only through the eect on equilibrium A?. Hence, we
can evaluate the welfare eect of an increase in 	m and/or 	 by taking derivatives of the
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which is positive if and only if A? >
p
 = m. Keeping in mind that A? is strictly decreasing
in (	m;	), we obtain:
Lemma 5. Suppose households coordinate on the highest welfare equilibrium and x some
( m; ). Then, when 	 6= U(	m), welfare decreases continuously in (	m;	) if and only
if A? >
p
 = m. When 	 = U(	m), a marginal increase in (	m;	) causes welfare to
jump down.
Equipped with this lemma, we can precisely characterize the region of the (	m;	) plane
where welfare is decreasing in (	m;	). Let's dene, for all 	m  0, the boundary
 (	m)  sup
(





= 0 if the set is empty:
Then, because A? is decreasing and left-continuous in (	m;	), it follows that A? 
p
 = m
if and only if 	   (	m). So welfare is decreasing when (	m;	) falls below the boundary
	 =  (	m). Precisely, by Lemma 5, when 	 6= U(	m), welfare is continuously decreasing
if and only if 	 <  (	m). When 	 = U(	m), welfare jumps down.
23In the appendix, we demonstrate that  (	m) > 0 for some 	m, so that the region below
the boundary, 	 <  (	m), is in general not empty. In addition, we provide a parametric
description of  (	m):
Proposition 6 (U-Shaped Welfare). Suppose that households coordinate on the highest wel-
fare equilibrium and x some ( m; ). Let (	m) = 2
 p
  m    

  ( = m)	m and
 (	m) = maxf0;(	m);U(	m)g whenever U(	m) is dened
= maxf0;(	m)g otherwise;
and where ( 	m)  U( 	m). Then, when 	 6= U(	m), welfare decreases continuously in
(	m;	) if and only if 	 <  (	m). When, 	 = U(	m), welfare jumps down.
The boundary  (	m) is shown in Figure 3. Along any increasing curve in the (	m;	)
plane that passes through the origin, welfare will have a U shape: it will decrease rst, reach
a minimum when crossing the boundary 	 =  (	m) from below, and increase thereafter.
Note also that the curve may cross the boundary 	 = U(	m) before or at the same time
as the boundary 	 =  (	m). At that crossing point, the high equilibrium disappears and
welfare will have a negative jump.
One may suspect that the negative welfare result only arises when there are multiple
equilibria coupled with that fact that we have arbitrarily chosen to focus on the high welfare
equilibrium. The proposition claries that it is not the case: welfare can decrease when
increasing (	m;	) even in regions where the equilibrium is unique. For example, if   <
 m < 27 , then the equilibrium is unique and the region of the (	m;	) plane where
welfare decreases is non-empty.
Another implication of the proposition is that an optimal communication policy is bang-
bang:
Corollary 1 (Bang-Bang Communication). Suppose the government has multidimensional
information about m and  that would permit an increase of public precisions. Then, the
optimal communication policy is to announce all or none of the information.
This means that, in this setup, either full transparency or full opacity is optimal: selec-
tively picking the information to announce, or revealing only part of the available informa-





Figure 3: The solid line is the boundary 	 =  (	m) above which welfare decreases in
(	m;	). The dotted line shows the boundaries of the set M.
the shock m is the sum of three components: a shock to a narrow monetary aggregate, a
velocity shock, and an observational noise. We show that, for small releases of public in-
formation, the bang bang result only applies \component-by-component". For instance, it
can be optimal to release public information about the narrow monetary aggregate, and not
about the velocity shock.
The next proposition studies some conditions for transparency and opacity to be optimal:
Proposition 7. A suciently large release of public information about 	m or 	 will always
increase welfare. On the other hand, for any given nite increase of public precisions, there
exists ( m; ) such that this increase is welfare decreasing.
The rst point of the proposition intuitively arises from the fact that, if 	m goes to
innity, then households are no longer confused about monetary shocks and they can extract
a signal of arbitrarily high precision about  from the observation of prices; their posterior
precision goes to innity and welfare is maximized. Of course, if 	 goes to innity, then
the posterior precision goes to innity as well (as information can never be destroyed).
The second point of the Proposition follows from the parametric form of  (	m) given in
Proposition 6: in particular, if  m is large enough, then 	 < (	m)   (	m), so that an
increase of public information up to (	m;	) decreases welfare.
25Explaining the Negative Welfare Result: The Role of Complementarities
Recall that Lemma 5 showed that, in order for public information to reduce welfare, it is
necessary and sucient that A? >
p
 = m. Since A?  1, it follows that a necessary
condition for public information to reduce welfare is that  m   . In particular, we must
have that  m > 0, meaning that the distribution of price must generate private information.
In Amador and Weill (2006), we obtained a similar result in an abstract model of information
diusion: private learning from other agents' actions is necessary for public information to
be welfare reducing.
In order to clarify this point and highlight the importance of the endogenous private
information generated by prices, we rst show that, in the absence of an eect on endogenous
private information, public information is always benecial:
Lemma 6. Holding  0
    + A2
? m the same,
(i) the equilibrium weight A which solves





is a decreasing function of 	m and 	: @A=@	m < 0 and @A=@	 < 0, and
(ii) the posterior precision  0
 + 	 + A2
	m is an increasing function of 	m and 	.
The lemma shows that, when  0
 is held constant, although public information about
m or  reduces the equilibrium sensitivity A, it always increases the posterior precision
 0
 + 	 + A2
	m. The intuition for this result is as follows. The posterior public precision,
	 + A2
	m, cannot decrease with an increase in (	m;	) given that  0
 remained constant.
Indeed, if the posterior public precision had decreased, households would nd it optimal to
rely more on their private information, so the equilibrium A would have to increase. This
implies, in turn, an increase in 	 + A2
	m, contradicting the assumed decrease in public
knowledge.
It follows also from the above lemma that, for public information to be welfare reducing,
a higher reduction in the equilibrium A? needs to be generated. This is where the comple-
mentarities provide a powerful amplication mechanism. Consider, for instance, an increase
in 	m. This causes A to decrease, which always decreases the amount A2 m of private
26information generated by price. This prompts households to rely less on their private infor-
mation, i.e., to lower A, which decreases A2 m further, prompts households to lower A, and
so on.
Informally, by applying the implicit function theorem (while assuming dierentiability) to
the equilibrium xed-point equation (31), we nd that the marginal change in the equilibrium





















 > 0 and H	0
 < 0 are the partial derivatives of H with respect to  0
 and 	0
,
respectively. Because of the complementarities in actions created by the endogenous private
information, the equilibrium sensitivity A? falls by more than if  0
 had remained constant.
This can reduce the total amount A2 m +A2	m of information generated by prices, even if
	m increases.
4.3 Related Results from the Literature
Perhaps the best known related result is that of Morris and Shin (2002), who have shown, in
the context of a beauty contest game, that public information can reduce welfare. Although
reminiscent of their result, ours does not arise from agents' socially wasteful desire to coor-
dinate their actions, but instead from the endogenous aggregation of information through
prices. In particular, in Morris and Shin (2002), public information always reduces agents'
uncertainty about fundamentals, while in our model it can have the opposite eect (and this
is the driver of our welfare result).
Morris and Shin (2002) emphasize that releases of public information are welfare decreas-
ing when the precision of the private information about the aggregate state of the economy
is suciently large. In our economy, where the aggregate state has two dimensions, m and
, this result does not always hold. For instance, consider the case when 	 = 0. Then, the
equilibrium is unique and an increase in 	m reduces welfare if and only if







27One sees that, as in Morris and Shin (2002), a larger  m increases the range where public
announcements are welfare decreasing. A larger  , however, has the opposite eect.
In Svensson's (2006) critique of Morris and Shin (2002), it is proposed that a conservative
benchmark of how likely it is that public information is welfare reducing is when the precision
of the public and the private signals are the same. Indeed, in practice, one would expect the
monetary authority to know at least as much about economic shocks as the private sector.
When imposing this restriction in Morris and Shin (2002)'s model, Svensson (2006) nds
that public information is welfare increasing. He concludes that Morris and Shin (2002)
are, in fact, pro-transparency. In our multidimensional economy, let us interpret Svensson's
restriction as letting 	m =  m and 	 =  . From Proposition 6, in order for a public release











which, when 	m =  m and   = 	, is equivalent to  m > 4 . If this condition is satised,
then, public information about m decreases welfare even though the precision of the public
and private signals about m are the same.
Some recent papers have shown the reappearance of multiple equilibria in global games
if information is publicly aggregated through prices (see Angeletos and Werning (2006) and
Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2006)). It is worth noticing that, dierently from these
papers (and global games in general), in our current model multiplicity is generated even
though there are no payo externalities and, under full information, our model will always
feature a unique equilibrium. Also, the focus of our analysis is not to study the multiplicity
in itself, but instead to understand the role of public information releases on welfare and
uncertainty.
Lastly, our paper is related to the recent work of Ganguli and Yang (2007) who study
information acquisition in a noisy rational expectations nancial market model. Under
the assumption that investors have private information about the amount of noise trading,
they also nd that their model may admit multiple equilibria. This is formally similar to
our assumption that households have private information about the money supply. Note
however, that our main results do not concern the multiplicity itself, but welfare analysis
(which include situations where the set of equilibria is a singleton) and how multiplicity is
28aected by public announcements.
5 Extensions
In this last section, we provide three extensions of our model. In Subsection 5.1, we add a
velocity shock to the model in order to demonstrate that M can indeed be interpreted as a
broad monetary aggregate. Also, we show how our model can easily accommodate multiple
shocks. In Subsection 5.2, we open a centralized nancial market for a one-period nominal
bond and show that all our results go through. In Subsection 5.3 we introduce an large
idiosyncratic component to the agents' decisions, and show that our results are not aected.
5.1 Narrow versus Broad Monetary Aggregates
The objective of the exposition so far has been to clarify the forces at play and to gain an
understanding of the mechanism through which public information can be welfare reducing.
For that reason, we have been imprecise about what the monetary shock m stands for.
In this section, we provide an extension of our model where the shock m is the sum of
three underlying shocks: a shock to a narrow monetary aggregate, a velocity shock that
represents uncertainty about credit conditions, and an observational noise to capture the
noise in preliminary price level statistics. We then proceed to derive a general condition for
the marginal release of information regarding either one of these three shocks to be welfare
increasing: we nd that the release of marginal public information about a shock is welfare
increasing if the ratio of public to private knowledge about that particular shock is suciently
small. Thus, for small release of public information, our bang-bang communication result
applies component by component: for instance, it can be optimal to release information
about the narrow monetary aggregate, but not about the velocity shock.
The Model
We begin by distinguishing between narrow and broad monetary aggregates through the
introduction of velocity shocks: we let the price level in every location not only depend
on the local money endowment Mi, but also on some level of velocity, Vi. Precisely, in
the equilibrium to be described, the amount of liquidity that enters the quantity equation
is not Mi, but the product MiVi, which we interpret as a broad monetary measure. We
29assume that the monetary authority has complete information about the distribution of
money endowments, Mi. This represents disaggregated information that the Central Bank
collects about narrow measures of money, such as the monetary base. On the other hand,
we assume that the Central Bank has imperfect information about the velocity shocks, Vi.
These could represent, for instance, partial information about overall credit conditions in
the economy.








where Tit are nominal transfers made by the government to household i at the beginning
of period t, and Vi represent a local velocity parameter. A standard interpretation of this
velocity parameter is that a household can use credit to purchase a fraction (1  1=Vi) of its
consumption goods, but has to purchase the rest of the goods with cash. According to this
interpretation, Vi is positively related to the amount of inside money created in location i.










For tractability, we assume that the Central Bank implements the Friedman rule10 by
shrinking the money supply at rate : we assume that at time t, households in location i have
to pay a lump sum tax Tit =  (1 )t 1Mi. We let the Central Bank know the distribution
of the initial cash holdings so it has sucient information to implement this policy. Note as
well that the Friedman rule is optimal in this economy from period 2 onwards.11






10It is possible to solve for an equilibrium under the assumption that the money supply is constant. We
would need to modify the distributional assumptions on the velocity shocks to guarantee that the model
remains log-normal. These changes would not aect the bottom-line of the results that follow. The details
of this exercise are available from the authors upon request.
11Whether the Friedman rule is optimal in period 1 remains to be shown. The diculty relates to foot-
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tM = t R
Midi, the initial aggregate money stock, which accounts for
the ever shrinking aggregate money supply.
Each of the households is initially endowed with the same information about  and M
as before.
The velocity parameter in each location is given by logVi  ^ vi = v + "vi, where "vi
is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a precision  v, and where v captures an
aggregate velocity shock. In addition, households share the common prior that the average
velocity, v, is normally distributed12 with a mean of zero and a precision 	v.
Households do not observe the aggregate values m or v, which are assumed to be uncor-
related. However, they imperfectly observe the average price level in the economy; that is,
they observe p+"p, where p is the log average price and "p is a normal noise with mean zero
and precision 	p, and independent of everything else.
As before, public releases of information boil down to increases in the public precisions
	m, 	v, and 	p. If the Central Bank releases its perfect information about m, then it can
increase the corresponding public precision, 	m, towards innity. The monetary authority,
however, does not have full information regarding the velocity shock: it can only increase
	v up to some nite amount.
Optimization by the households, together with the market-clearing conditions, implies
that in equilibrium








Once  is revealed in period 2, the equilibrium is deterministic, so the only interesting
behavior occurs in period 1 (as in the baseline model). The denition of equilibrium is the
same as in Denition 1, except that we now require that the average log price be
p = a0 + a1 + a2m + a3v + a4"p ; (39)
that the conditional expectations include vi as part of the information sets and that equa-
12Since Vi is log-normally distributed in the cross section, Vi can be smaller than 1, implying that the
fraction of credit goods, 1 1=Vi, may be less than zero. However, by choosing the mean of Vi large enough,
we can make this happen with arbitrarily small probability.
31tions (16) and (17) are replaced by equations (36) and (37). In the appendix, we guess that
observing the price with noise is observationally equivalent to ^ p =  + m=A + v=B + "p=C,
and show that:
Proposition 8. There exists a linear equilibrium. In a linear equilibrium, the total precision
of the posterior about  solves the following equation:
 = G()    + 	 +

1
A2( m + 	m)
+
1
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Conversely, every solution where  2 (  + 	;1) corresponds to a linear equilibrium.
It can be shown that the linear equilibria in this model converge to the ones in our baseline
model as 	v and 	p tend towards innity. Similarly as in the baseline model, there is the
possibility of multiple equilibria. We focus, as before, then on characterizing the equilibrium
corresponding to the highest xed point ? of G(), which delivers the highest welfare.
Optimal Communication
By analyzing how the function G() varies with the public precisions 	m, 	v, and 	p, we
can show that,
Proposition 9. A marginal release of information about shock i 2 fm;v;"pg is welfare







The release of marginal public information about a shock is welfare increasing if the ratio
of public to private knowledge about that particular shock is suciently small. A direct
corollary is that it is always benecial to release public information about shocks that the
households have no private information about. This implies that improving the observation
of the price, by increasing the precision of the noise "p, always increases welfare.
Another result that follows is that if a benevolent public agency has full information
about any shock, it should announce it:
32Proposition 10. Revealing the realization of any shock i 2 fm;v;"pg increases the precision
of households' beliefs about  and increases welfare.
Hence the Central Bank should announce the state of the narrow monetary aggregate.
Also the Central Bank should try to ensure that the aggregate price level is observed as
eciently as possible by the agents. Given this, whether the publication of a signal about
the nominal output (or equivalently, about the velocity shock) is welfare improving or not
depends on the conditions stated in Proposition 9. In particular, if 	p = 1, so the price
level is observed without noise, the model thus converges to our baseline model, with only
two shocks:  and v.
5.2 A Bond Market: No Trade and No Information
A familiar way in which an economy aggregates dispersed private information is through
nancial markets. One might wonder, then, how robust the results regarding the social
value of public announcements that we have obtained are to the introduction of a nancial
market where households from dierent locations can interact. To answer this question,
we introduce what we believe is a natural nancial market in our economy: households are
allowed to trade a nominal bond in zero net supply. Our main result is that the equilibrium
nominal interest rate in that market does not provide any new information to the households
and that the allocation obtained by a competitive equilibrium when the bond market is closed
remains the allocation of a competitive equilibrium once it is opened.
Thus, suppose that any household at period t can buy a bond that pays a unit of the
currency in the following period, t+1, and let us denote by Qt its nominal price. The budget
















where Bit is the amount of the bond held by household i in period t. As before, the household
is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
The bond market clearing condition is, at all times:
Z
Bit di = 0: (41)









We now check that the allocation without a nominal bond market remains an equilibrium








which is the same for all agents. Note as well that the price of the bond does not reveal
any information: it is just equal to the discount factor. Thus, any equilibrium allocation
when the bond market is closed remains an equilibrium when the bond market is open with
Bit = 0 and Qt = .
Our result is obtained because our economy satises the conditions for a no-trade equilib-
rium that Constantinides and Due (1996) famously pointed out in their incomplete market
model. First, households have homothetic utility and second, in equilibrium, the logarithm
of local consumptions and local prices
logCit =  Eit [] + log  
1
2vart []
logPit = ^ mi   logCit
follow identically distributed random walks with drifts. Indeed, the rst term is a martingale,
because it is the conditional expectation of a xed random variable, . The drift, given by
the second and the third term, is the same across locations because all households share the
same posterior precision. Taken together, these imply that the expectation of the nominal
stochastic discount factor, (Pit+1=Pit)(Cit+1=Cit), is constant across locations.
5.3 Large idiosyncratic variations in price
In the model we have described so far, idiosyncratic variation in prices is generated from
the private information regarding the aggregate disturbances. A recent literature has doc-
umented that the variation in the idiosyncratic component of prices (and other quantities)
is an order of magnitude bigger than the variation of the aggregate components. Hence,
one may argue that the main concern of economic agents is not forecasting macroeconomic
34shocks, but instead responding to idiosyncratic shocks. In this section, we address this con-
cern explicitly by introducing idiosyncratic shocks into the model, and showing that our
welfare results are consistent with arbitrarily large levels of idiosyncratic volatility.
Suppose that the productivity parameter now includes a perfectly observed idiosyncratic








log(Cit)   ^ iLit
#
where now ^  = egi is a combination of an aggregate component , which is as before,
and an idiosyncratic component gi, generated from a normal distribution with mean zero
and constant variance, and independent across locations. We assume that the individual
realization of gi is observed perfectly by households in location i.
Following the same steps as in the previous sections, we obtain an optimality condition:







Substituting this into the ex-ante (per period) welfare function:
E0

log(Cit)   ^ iLit

= E0 logEit [] + E0 [gi] + log    = E0 logEit [] + log   
which delivers the same welfare function as the one obtained in section 4. The equilibrium
prices are then given by:





Given that gi is idiosyncratic, its eect disappears in the aggregate, and the average log price
in the economy is the same as the obtained in the baseline model. This implies that the
equilibrium has not changed; and the results of Propositions 6 and 7 hold unmodied.
Note that according to the price equation we have obtained above, any level of idiosyn-
cratic variation can now be added to the model by changing the variance of gi without
aecting the welfare results. We interpret this as following: the fact that there is a large
idiosyncratic component to the individual decisions do not imply that the welfare eects
of announcements regarding the underlying aggregate shocks are necessarily trivialized. In
particular, in the present example, idiosyncratic volatility does not aect at all the welfare
35calculations.
6 Conclusions
We have characterized the conditions under which public announcements about real and
nominal aggregate shocks reduce the informativeness of prices and may actually increase
uncertainty about fundamentals and lower welfare. Although we focus on the case where
households observe nominal prices, we think it is reasonable to conjecture that a similar
outcome will prevail in the presence of nancial markets that also aggregate dispersed infor-
mation in the economy.
Our model is basically static (the innite horizon was just necessary for money to have
value). However, similar techniques as the ones developed here may prove useful in studying
the dynamic eects of information releases, and also in answering the timing question: when
to make public announcements. This is all left for future research.
36A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The right hand side of the xed point equation (31) is strictly positive when A = 0 and





= ^ z = A2
?	m=(	 +A2
?	m)( + m=A?) back into equation (29), we see
that our linear guess that p = 0 + 1 + 2m is veried for 0 =  log + 1=2( 0
 + 	0
),
1 = (A?	 + A2
?	m)=(	 + A2
?	m), and 2 = 1=A?. Also, A = A? uniquely determines
the cross-sectional distribution of log prices, which is normal with a constant dispersion, as
can be seen from equation (28) after substituting in for equations (26),  0
 =   +A2
? m and
	0
 = 	 + A2
?	m. Also, A? determines the cross-sectional distribution of mean beliefs as
implied by (26). Finally this determines a unique distribution for consumption and labor
supplies, according to (16). This proves that A? determines a unique equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Propositions 2, 3, and 4
We start from the equilibrium equation (31):
A =
  + A2 m
  + A2 m + 	 + A2	m
, A
3( m + 	m)   A
2 m + A(  + 	)     = 0
, A





















,  = ( A




,   G(A;m);
where    m= ,   	= , m  	m= m, and G(A;m) depends implicitly on .
Straightforward calculations show that
(R1) G(A;m) goes to innity when A goes to zero;
(R2) G(A;m) is negative when A < 0 and A  1.
37After taking derivatives, we nd that @G=@A = D(A;m)=A2, where





= 2A[1   3A(1 + m)]:
It thus follows that D(A;m) is a hump-shaped function of A, is negative when A = 0 and












It then follows that the function G(A;m) is strictly decreasing in A 2 (0;1) if and only if
the maximum of D(A;m) is negative. Precisely:
(R3) If   27 or





, then G(A;m) is strictly decreasing in
A 2 (0;1).
(R4) If  > 27 and m <
p
=27   1, then there exists
0 < a1(m) <
1
3(1 + m)
< a2(m) < 1















(R5) The function a1(m) is increasing in m and the function a2(m) is decreasing in m.
(R6) As m approaches  m 
p
=27   1, both a1(m) and a2(m) tend to 1=[3(1 +  m)].
Result (R5) follows from an application of the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT). To prove
(R6), note rst that, by (R5), since ai(m) is monotonic and bounded, it must have a limit
 ai as m approaches  m. By continuity of D(A;m), we must have that D( ai;  m) = 0. Now,
note that when m =  m, this equation has the unique solution A = 1=[3(1+  m)]. Thus, we
must have that  ai = 1=[3(1 +  m], which proves the claim.
Now let us combine results (R2)-(R6) to nd all solutions of the equation G(A;m) = ).
First note that (R1) and (R2) show that there exists at least one solution, and that all
solutions lie in the open interval (0;1). In case (R3), the function G(A;m) is strictly
38decreasing in A, so the solution is unique. To analyze the second case, (R4), we start by









(R7) The function B(i)(m) is strictly decreasing in m, for i 2 f1;2g.
















a value of  for which
there are multiple equilibria
Figure 4: The function G(A).
Now the set of equilibria can be described graphically, as follows. Figure 4 shows a plot
of G(A;m) as a function of A. The local minimum is achieved at A = a1 and is equal to
B(1)(m), and the local maximum is achieved at a2 and is equal to B(2)(m). The gure
makes it clear that
(R8) if  < B(1)(m), then there is a unique equilibrium, which is greater than a2(m);
(R9) if  = B(1)(m), then there are two equilibria, AL = a1(m) < a2(m) < AH;
(R10) if B(1)(m) <  < B(2)(m), then there are three equilibria AL < a1(m) < AM <
a2(m) < AH;
(R11) if  = B(2)(m), then there are two equilibria, AL < a1(m) < a2(m) = AH;
39(R12) if  > B(2)(m), then there is a unique equilibrium, which is smaller than a1.
Replacing m = 	m= m,  = 	=  and  =  m=  in the above, we nd that the set M
is described parametrically by:
0  	m <  	m
and L(	m)  	  U(	m);
where:



















Note that L(	m) and U(	m) are implicit functions of ( m; ). By (R7), the boundaries
L(	m) and U(	m) are decreasing functions of 	m. Also, because a2(m) is decreasing, it
follows from (42) that B(2)(m) is convex. Lastly, by (R6), we have that L( 	m) = U( 	m).
Now the rst two points of Proposition 4 follow from (R8)-(R12). The last two points
follow from an application of the IFT on the boundaries. Namely, on the upper boundary, one
applies the IFT at A = AL, because @G=@A(AL) < 0. This shows that the unique equilibrium
above the boundary converges towards AL as (	m;	) approaches the boundary from above.
Note that the reasoning does not apply to the other equilibrium, AH: indeed, because
@G=@A(AH) = 0, one cannot apply the IFT at A = AH. Similarly, on the lower boundary,
one applies the IFT to A = AH, but cannot apply it at A = AL because @G=@(AL) = 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The ex ante time-t ow welfare of a household is




=  E0 logEit[] + log   ;
where we used that Cit = Lit = Eit[] 1 together with the law of iterated expectations.
From period 2 onwards, Eit = . And we know that E0[log] = 0 by the prior dis-
tribution assumption. So, E0 logEit[] = E0[log] = 0. In the rst period, we have that
40E0 logEi1[] = E0[Ei1 log]+vari1[log]=2. Using the law of iterated expectations and that
vari1[log] = (  +A2 m +	 +A2	m) 1, and adding up through time, the result follows.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
We will be using the notations and functions dened in the proof of Appendix A.2. We rst
note at the highest equilibrium A, the best reply H(  +A2 m;	 +A2	m) must cross the
45-degree line from above. Since, at the same time, the best reply decreases in both (	;	m),
the result follows. Continuity follows from the IFT, which we can apply everywhere except
on the upper boundary 	 = U(	m), because @G=@A(AH;m) = 0.
Fix 	 and let 	m go to innity. Given that A? decreases in 	m and is bounded below
by 0, A? converges to a nite limit as 	m tends to innity. Clearly, this limit cannot be
positive, or else equation (31) cannot be satised for suciently high 	m. Hence A? tends
to 0 as 	m tends to innity.
From the equilibrium equation (31), it follows that
0  A? = H(  + A
2
? m;	 + A
2
?	m)  H(  +  m;	) =
  +  m
  +  m + 	
:
The rst inequality follows from the fact that H( 0
;	0
) is increasing in  0
 and decreasing
in 	0
, together with the observation that A? 2 [0;1]. Now, letting 	 go to innity, one sees
that A? must go to zero.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
We will be using the notations and the functions dened in the proof of Appendix A.2. First,
recall that, using the xed-point equation, the posterior precision can be written
 =   + 	 + A
2















Now recall that A? is decreasing in both 	m and 	. By proposition 4, along an increasing
path of 	m and 	, A? is continuous except at the upper frontier where it jumps down. It
41then follows that,
(R13) If A? is continuous, then a marginal increase in public information reduces welfare if
and only if A? >
p
1=.
Where, keeping the notations of the previous proof,  =  m= . Now we show:
(R14) Suppose there is a unique equilibrium. Then, a marginal increase in public information





  m  C(m):
Indeed, recall that if there is a unique equilibrium, A? is continuous, and the best reply is
above the 45-degree line for all A < A? and below the 45-degree line for all A > A?. Thus,
p
1= < A? if and only if, when A =
p
1=, the best reply is above the 45-degree line.
Plugging A =
p
1= in the inequality H(  + A2 m;	 + A2	m) > A and rearranging, one
obtains the condition (R14).
Now consider parameters  and 	m such that there are multiple equilibria. We start by
showing:
(R15) Suppose  > 27 and m <
p
=27   1. Then, a1 >
p
1=.
Indeed, note that, if A 
p
1=, then D(A;m) < 0. Since D(a1;m) = 0, it thus follows
that a1 >
p
1=. Next, we prove:
(R16) Suppose  > 27 and m <
p
=27   1. Then, for all  < B(2)(m), welfare decreases
continuously with public information.
Indeed, rst recall from (R8) that for all  < B(1)(m), there is a unique equilibrium, A?,
that is larger than a2, and thus larger than a1. Then, for all B(1)(m)   < B(2)(m),
the largest equilibrium, A?, is also larger than a1. Because of (R15), it follows that for all
 < B(2)(m), A? >
p
1=. Thus, from (R13), we know that, for all  < B(2)(m), a
marginal increase in public information reduces welfare.
Taken together, (R14) and (R16), we can generalize to:




 < C(m) otherwise:
42Welfare jumps down with public information if and only if  = B(2)(m).
Indeed if B(2)(m) is not dened then this is the same as (R14). If B(2)(m) is dened,
let's start with the \only if" part. If public information decreases welfare, then either
(i)  < B(2)(m) or (ii)  > B(2)(m), the equilibrium is unique and by (R14),  <
C(m). Either way,  < maxfB(2)(m);C(m)g. For the \if" part, suppose that  <
maxfB(2)(m);C(m)g. Then, either   B(2)(m) and by (R17) a marginal increase in
public information decreases welfare. Or  > B(2)(m) and  < C(m), the equilibrium
is unique, and a marginal increase in public information decreases welfare. The last point
follows directly from the fact that, when  = B(2)(m), the aggregate weight A? jumps
down.
The result of the Proposition 6 then follows directly by plugging in the above  = 	= ,
m = 	m= m and  =  m= . The following additional result further characterizes the shape
of the boundary, showing among other things that U( 	m)  ( 	m).
An Additional Result
We now characterize further the shape of the boundary. Namely, we show
Lemma 7. Suppose that 0  m <
p


















2)   1 is less than
p
=27   1; thus, when m =
p
=27   1, C(m) >
B(2)(m).





2)   1g and below C(m) after. So the boundary of result (R17) coincides with B(2)(m)




2)   1 < 0; in that case, C(m) > B(2)(m) all along. We now proceed to prove
the lemma, starting with
(R18) Suppose that 0  m <
p
=27   1. Then, B(2)(m) < C(m) if and only if, when
 = C(m), there is a unique equilibrium.
Consider rst the \only if" part. Suppose that B(2)(m) < C(m) and let  = C(m).
Then,  > B(2)(m) so there is a unique equilibrium by (R12). Thus, there is a unique
43equilibrium. We proceed with the \if" part. Suppose that, when  = C(m), there is a
unique equilibrium. Thus, (m;) could be either above the upper boundary,  > B(2)(m),
or below the lower boundary,  < B(1)(m). But, if (m;) were below the lower boundary,
then, by (R16), an increase in  would decrease welfare, which is impossible because  =
C(m).
Now consider the equilibrium equation G(A;m) = , when  = C(m). Straightfor-










   (1 + m)

  1 = 0:
One sees that A =
p




















 is the unique solution if and only if the discriminant of the second multi-
plicative term is negative, i.e., if and only if
(1 + m)
2   6(1 + m)
p
 +  < 0:











The rst root is smaller than
p
=27 1; the second root is greater. Note that the rst root
may be less than zero. It then follows that, when 0  m <
p
=27   1, the discriminant is












, which, together with (R18), proves
the lemma.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1





























44and let W(	(i)) be the level of utilitarian welfare associated with 	(i). Now, there are only
two possibilities: If 	(2) lies below the boundary 	 =  (	m), so does 	(1) and it follows
that W(	(2))  W(	(1)). If, on the other hand, 	(2) lies above the boundary 	 =  (	m),





Now suppose the government has information that would allow an increase in the exogenous
public knowledge from 	(1) up to 	(3). The last inequality shows that any intermediate
announcement, 	(2), will always be dominated by either saying nothing at all, 	(1), or
releasing all the information, 	(3).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7




As 	m or 	 go to innity, A? goes to zero and so posterior precision goes to innity. Thus,
a suciently large increase in 	m or 	 will increase posterior precision, and thus welfare.
The second point of the proposition is shown in the text.
A.8 Proof of Propositions 8 to 10
Let us dene A  a1=a2 and B  a1=a3 and C  a1=(a4   1). The observing the price plus
noise is equivalent to observing
^ p =  + m=A + v=B + "p=C:
The household observes then ^ p together with i, mi and vi. One can then show that the



















45and precision  given by
 =   + 	 +

1
A2( m + 	m)
+
1






Now, aggregating across consumers and ignoring all terms that are common knowledge, we
obtain that
p + "p =
Z







(       	) m=A





(       	) v=B
( v + 	v)

+ "p:






(       	) m







(       	) v







Let us dene G() to be the right hand side of equation 43 after substituting in for
the above values of A, B, and C. Existence of an equilibrium follows by noticing that
G(  + 	) >   + 	 and lim!1 G() < 1. This nishes the proof of the result in
proposition 8.
In order to prove Proposition 9, we rst take derivative of G() with respect to 	i. We







Since, at  = ?, the function G() crosses the 45 degree line from above, it follows that if
the above inequality is satised, a marginal increase in 	i lowers ?, and vice versa if the
reverse inequality is satised.
Finally to proof Proposition 10, note that if 	m = 1, then the xed point equation
converges to
 =  G() =   + 	 +

1





46Note that  G() > G() for  >   + 	, implying that the highest xed point of  G() is
larger than the highest xed point of G(). A similar argument applies to 	v = 1. The
case of 	p = 1 follows more directly as marginal increases are always benecial in this case.
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